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 ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION AND INTERNATIONAL 
COMPETITIVENESS: A CRITICAL REVIEW 
 
Abstract 
In this paper we critically review the literature on environmental regulation and 
competitiveness at a national level. The concept of international competitiveness (in relation 
to environmental regulation) is assessed in two broad schools of thought: neoclassical 
economics and the competitiveness school to which the Porter Hypothesis belongs. We 
identify the Pollution Haven Hypothesis (PHH) as the least common denominator for 
empirical evaluation of the main themes of these two competing schools of thought. As a 
minimum, one would need to find evidence on PHH to question the validity of the Porter 
Hypothesis. A fully legitimate test of the Porter Hypothesis should, inter alia, have a 
particular emphasis on the impact of well-designed environmental policies on high-value 
sectors of an economy. Examining the recent empirical literature on the PHH we find that the 
evidence remains inconclusive. This leaves the Porter Hypothesis largely unscathed and 
challenges the widely-held view of the existence of a trade-off between economic performance and 
environmental quality. 
 
Key words: competitiveness, environmental regulation, Porter Hypothesis 
 
 
 
                       
 
 
 2 
1. Introduction 
Environmental policymaking is often riddled with concerns over international 
competitiveness. For example, the growing discussion on the theoretical and practical merit 
of a ‘border carbon tax’ is a direct result of the assumption that jurisdictions with higher 
carbon prices will be at a competitive disadvantage (Subramanian and Mattoo 2013). Also, in 
several European countries that have implemented a carbon tax, industry lobby has succeeded 
in securing exemptions or rebates for trade- and energy-intensive firms to avoid the ‘risk of 
job losses and carbon-leakage’ (Martin, et al.,  2012). A related broader issue here is that if 
environmental regulations indeed impair competitiveness, there might be some ground for 
bringing domestic environmental regulations into the domain of trade agreements to prevent a 
possible ‘race to the bottom’ in environmental standards (Copeland and Taylor, 2004). 
What is the precise relationship between environmental regulation and international 
competitiveness? The burgeoning empirical literature is yet to reach a consensus about this 
question (see, e.g., Jaffe et al., 1995; Porter and van der Linde, 1995; Ekins and Pecks, 1999; 
Copeland and Taylor, 2004; Fullerton, 2006). It can be argued that one of the problems in the 
endeavour for unequivocal evidence is the controversial nature of the concept of 
competitiveness at the national level and the difficulty of its measurement. Despite wide use 
in academia and policy circles, the concept of competitiveness is often considered 
problematic and ill-defined (Krugman, 1996; Neary, 2006, Porter et al. 2016).  
In this paper we complement the classic reviews of Jaffe et al. (1995) and Copeland and 
Taylor (2004) by critically assessing the concept of international competitiveness (in relation 
to environmental regulation) in two broad schools of thought: neoclassical economics and the 
competitiveness school, and by focussing specifically on the national (macro) level use of the 
concept of international competitiveness.1 By ‘critical’ we mean we start with an interpretive 
survey of the contentious term ‘international competitiveness’ – rather than taking it as if it 
were a straightforward concept. This will lead us to relating the Porter Hypothesis to its 
underlying paradigms of what we refer to as the ‘competitiveness school’ and the related 
infant industry argument. One consequence of this is the emphasis on a central idea in Porter 
Hypothesis: ‘high and low value’ products or activities. 
The contribution of this paper is twofold. First, by probing into the underlying theories of 
the two broad classes of thought on competitiveness, we will clarify some of the muddled 
interpretations of the various hypotheses concerning the relationship between environmental 
policy and competitiveness and the subsequent empirical testing. For example, we will argue 
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that trying to test the Porter Hypothesis based on the performance of what Michael Porter 
might call ‘dog’ industries (not knowledge-intensive) would be barking up the wrong tree. 
Second, we present an exhaustive review and synthesis of the recent macro literature on 
environmental regulation and international competitiveness. More importantly, our survey 
presents an explicit comparison of the Porter Hypothesis with the neoclassical view on the 
relationship under discussion. We find that the evidence remains as inconclusive as ever – 
despite claims that accounting for the endogeneity of environmental policy and unobserved 
country or industry heterogeneity has achieved consensus in the literature.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Sections 2 and 3 discuss, respectively, 
the neoclassical economics and the competitiveness school views on the issue under 
discussion. Section 4 presents evaluation of the empirical evidence. Section 5 summarises 
and concludes the paper. 
2. Neoclassical economics on environmental regulation and competitiveness  
There is no commonly-accepted definition (and measure) of ‘national competitiveness’ 
among neoclassical economists; and they do not generally appear comfortable with the term 
perhaps because it suggests a zero-sum game conception of free trade, which is  supposed to 
be governed by the principle of comparative advantage (Boltho, 1996; Fagerberg, 1996; 
Neary, 2003; Neary, 2006).2 Nonetheless, there is evidently some acceptance, in neoclassical 
economics, of a legitimate policy concern for ‘competitiveness’,  as broadly related to a 
country’s trade performance, the value of its currency and its average income. This is 
reflected by one common use of the concept in neoclassical economics which is a cost-based 
account of competitiveness in the context of macroeconomic performance and its 
determinants (see, e.g., Boltho, 1996; Neary, 2006).3 Here a lack of ‘competitiveness’ is a 
problem of real exchange rate (defined as relative unit cost or/and price in a common 
currency) causing a persistent and undesirable current account deficit while the economy is at 
full-employment production levels (Boltho, 1996, pp. 2-3). Relative unit cost/price changes 
when, relative to other countries, the country’s unit cost/price or productivity change or the 
exchange rate changes. Thus it is assumed that the burden of adjustment to the current 
account deficit falls on a mixture of deflation and depreciation.  
In the context of the impact of environmental regulation/competitiveness linkages, the 
neoclassical view would assert that stringent environmental regulation in the form of 
environmental taxes or tradable permits or technological standards will increase production 
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costs to firms – because compliance in the form of, say, pollution abatement requires real 
resources – and puts them at a competitive disadvantage against their foreign competitors. 
Objections to this conclusion come in different ways which will be addressed in some 
detail in Section 3. Some words are nonetheless in order here. One major line of argument is 
that competitiveness is not a matter of cost alone but is also about new and improved 
products and processes that result from regulation induced environmental R&D and 
innovations (see Iraldo et al., 2011 for a summary). Another line of argument is that 
enhancement of competitiveness might also involve ‘corporate reputation’ or ‘green 
credentials’ in which case cost consideration alone is a poor guide to competitiveness (see 
e.g. Poelhekke and van der Ploeg 2015). 
Neoclassical economists’ response to the first line of argument is based on the assumption 
that firms are profit maximizers that would not ignore profitable endeavours. They argue that 
while from time to time, typically as an accident, regulations might lead firms to exploit 
hitherto unrealised opportunities; it would be generally implausible to assume regulation-
driven innovations that enhance competitiveness (Palmer et al., 1995). With respect to the 
second line of argument, neoclassical economists do not seem to have anything to say – to the 
best of our knowledge. While ‘corporate image’ as goodwill can generally represent an 
intangible asset for companies, in the world of neoclassical economics ‘corporate reputation’ 
does not seem to have a significant value.     
 So the bottom line for neoclassical economists is that regulations causes the location of 
production (especially that of pollution-intensive industries) to shift away from the domestic 
economy to countries with relatively lax environmental regulation (Copeland and Taylor, 
2004). In effect, the country’s international ‘competitiveness’ – in the sense of export 
performance and locational attractiveness – will be impaired.   Trade deficit would be a likely 
outcome.  
 Restoration of the trade balance in the ‘long-run’ is expected to reduce welfare because it 
will entail depreciation and/or real wage reductions. It is conceivable that the economy will 
restructure to engage in new sectors in which it can be more competitive. But restructuring or 
adjustments involve costs. Especially when the loss of competitiveness occurs in important 
sectors (in terms of employment and output), the transition to a new equilibrium can be 
painful (see, e.g., Jaffe et al., 1995; Ekins and Pecks, 1999). 
The above argument of focussing on adjustment costs is on the assumption that 
environmental regulation is set efficiently the world over, i.e. on the basis of cost-benefit 
considerations. There is no reason to believe this assumption is true. Especially in trans-
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boundary pollution problems (such as carbon dioxide emissions) where location of emissions 
is irrelevant, climate policy might be ineffective (and hence might not be set efficiently) due 
to relocation of ‘dirty’ industries. More generally, governments deprived of trade policy 
instruments may have an incentive to manipulate environmental policy as an instrument of 
trade and investment policy. One possible explanation for this is interest group politics where 
governments succumb to rent seeking groups and weaken environmental regulations. The 
main point here is that the possibility for such strategic uses of environmental policy might 
justify calls for bringing domestic environmental regulations into the domain of trade 
agreements to prevent a ‘race to the bottom’ in environmental standards (Copeland and 
Taylor, 2004). 
To summarise, the main conclusion of neoclassical economics is that regulated firms see 
their costs rising, putting them at a competitive disadvantage vis-à-vis their foreign 
competitors. This will in turn negatively impact the location of production and subsequent 
export performance of the national economy.4 This is the essence of the Pollution Haven 
Effect (PHE).5 
3. The competitiveness school on environmental regulation and competitiveness 
3.1. The concept of competitiveness in the competitiveness school 
An alternative to the neoclassical economics’ view on competitiveness is what we can call the 
competitiveness school. This school sees beyond ‘ability to sell’ and ‘locational 
attractiveness’, and generally adopts the view that international competitiveness is about 
wealth creation in the context of international division of labour (Reinert, 1995, 2009). This 
can be seen from the specific definitions given by various authors along the line of 
“competitiveness is our ability to produce goods and services that meet the test of 
international competition while our citizens enjoy a standards of living that is both rising and 
sustainable” Tyson (1992, p. 1). Similarly, Porter and Rivkin (2012a, p. 56) argue: “The U.S. 
is a competitive location to the extent that companies operating in the U.S. are able to 
compete successfully in the global economy while supporting high and rising living standards 
for the average American”.  
According to this school, competitiveness is thus primarily about engagement and 
efficiency in ‘high-value’ sectors that raise the overall performance of a national economy. 
“Being the most efficient in the ‘wrong’ activities, the opposite of competitiveness, leads to 
negative development” (Reinert, 1995, p. 26).  The ‘right’ activities are those characterized 
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by scale economies and imperfect competition and generally coincide with high-technology 
industries where their success creates national benefits in productivity and high-wage; hence 
such industries are the backbone of national competitiveness (Porter, 1990, p. 282; Tyson, 
1992, p. 18; see also Porter et al., 2016).6 The underlying key attribute of such ‘desirable’ 
activities is their capacity to foster innovation leading to increased productivity broadly 
defined – both process and product quality improvements (Fagerberg et al., 2006). 
The crucial element of this competitiveness view is that different activities play divergent 
roles in the overall domestic economic success: namely, high-technology industries are more 
‘valuable’ (Reinert, 1995, p. 33). That sounds trivial but not so, if you agree with the new 
trade theory (including its subfield: strategic trade theory) which demonstrates that it is 
possible to create comparative advantage in such valuable activities. The comparative 
advantage a country may have in these ‘desirable’ industries does not have much to do with 
factor endowments (Porter, 1990, p. 74). But what exactly forms the basis of trade that 
replaces (given) factor endowments, and how exactly does a ‘created’ trade pattern relate to 
domestic welfare? 
3.2. The basis of trade in ‘advanced products’ 
In what follows, we attempt to provide an intuitive answer to the questions we just posed. 
The answer provides the general framework underlying the original Porter Hypothesis which 
has a clear link to the ‘new trade theory’.7 The basis of trade in new trade theory is product 
differentiation and increasing returns to scale that permits trade between countries endowed 
with similar relative factor endowments.8 That is because specialization, together with larger 
scale of production, allows a country to reduce a product’ production costs relative to its 
trading partner (Helpman and Krugman, 1985). 
Increasing returns to scale is generally incompatible with perfectly competitive markets. 
With scale economies, marginal cost pricing results in a loss, so such technologies entail 
imperfect competition to allow above marginal cost pricing. Now, in the presence of 
increasing returns, a country that happens to have a larger share of the market at an early 
stage can eventually dominate the market because as scale increases costs fall and quality 
improves. Moreover, the existence of imperfect competition prevents productivity growth 
from fully translating into lower prices – an affront to the factor price equalization theorem of 
neoclassical trade theory. This means that a large proportion of the benefits of improved 
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productivity is retained in the form of higher wages, higher profits and higher income taxes in 
the producing nation (Reinert, 1995, p. 27). 
 A country’s larger share at an early stage can arise from an early ‘minor’ advantage (c.f 
Porter’s ‘first mover advantage’) – i.e. there is ‘path dependence’ (see note 6). This implies 
that a country can, in principle, use subsidies or tariffs to nurture selected industries that are 
potentially characterized by dynamic external economies. Conversely, a country that is less 
efficient than its trading partner in these industries will find it difficult to turn the balance of 
comparative advantage in its favour (c.f. where the Porter Hypothesis belittles the role of 
environmental compliance costs in international competitiveness – more on this below). 
The foregoing story underlies the traditional infant industry argument which justifies 
temporary protection (via trade barriers) of fledgling domestic industries from established 
and more efficient international competitors. In the short-run such protection would result in 
a national welfare loss caused by its substitution of low-cost imports by higher-cost, domestic 
production. In the long-run, however, the infant industry would mature and increase its 
productivity (owing mainly to innovations) that could outweigh the short-term static 
inefficiencies arising from a higher-cost domestic production. A key assumption in this 
process is the existence of external economies of scale operating within national boundaries.  
In other words, productivity-enhancing innovations have a collective impact on the industry 
and this impact depends on the size of the industry.9There is sufficient historical and more 
recent evidence on successful industrial policies (see Vietor, 2007 for detailed historical 
experience of industrial policy). For example in Japan the famous Ministry of International 
Trade and Industry in the 1950s-60s fostered ‘industry restructuring’ by selecting strategic 
industries for special support. Similarly, South Korea’s miraculous growth was a result of 
targeted industrial policy in the 1960s. In China the industrial policy adopted in the ninth 
five-year plan (1996-2000) targeted “five pillar industries for special protection”: machinery, 
electronics, petrochemicals, construction and electronics (p. 68). The 2008 Growth 
Commission Report of the World Bank states that “governments in the high-growth 
economies tried a variety of policies to help diversify exports or sustain competitiveness. 
These included industrial policies to promote investment in new sectors…” (p. 23). 
It should be noted that the above discussed government role on the basis of infant industry 
argument is not a substitute for but is in addition to one basic role for government generally 
accepted in the competitiveness debate (see Mulatu, 2016 for a detailed discussion). And that 
is a broad (i.e. not industry-specific) role for government to ensure enabling or supporting 
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national and business environments under which firms in general operate (Porter et al., 2008). 
Such environments should provide modern physical infrastructure, good healthcare and basic 
education, effective political institutions (such as rule of law), effective capital markets, 
efficient regulations (relating to business) and quality institutions for higher education and 
science. This has some parallel with the ‘factor condition’ corner of Porter’s (1990) classic 
diamond model. 
In summary the competitiveness school espouses the idea of competitiveness as a “winner-
picking exercise” by social planners for special protection or promotion (Arthur 1990, p. 84; 
Reinert, 1995, p. 41). 
3.3.  The competitiveness school and environmental regulation 
On the question of environmental regulation/competitiveness linkages, the competitiveness 
school, particularly Michael Porter represents a view that is in stark contrast to the view of 
neoclassical economics. He argues: “Strict environmental regulations do not inevitably hinder 
competitive advantage against foreign rivals” (Porter, 1991, p. 96).  Indeed the argument 
goes: well-designed environmental regulation can enhance growth and competitiveness by 
fostering innovation which results in returns that can partially, or more than fully, offset the 
costs of compliance (Porter and van der Linde, 1995, p. 98; see also Porter, 1990). It is this 
view that goes by the name of the “Porter Hypothesis”.  
One of the underlying reasons of these divergent views arguably lies in the source of 
comparative or ‘competitive advantage’ in the two paradigms. According to Porter and van 
der Linde resource endowment plays no significant role in the competitive advantage of 
firms, especially of those firms that are the ‘backbone’ of advanced economies. Hence, 
environmental regulation that is hypothesized to limit firms’ access to the ‘services of the 
environment’ does not have much to do with firms’ relative performance. They assert that: 
“Internationally competitive companies are not those with the cheapest inputs or the largest 
scale, but those with the capacity to improve and innovate continually” (Porter and van der 
Linde 1995, p. 98). 
Porter and van der Linde (1995, p. 100) identify five major reasons why well-designed 
environmental regulations can lead to a win-win outcome: 1) regulation serves as a signal to 
firms about resource inefficiencies and possibilities for technological improvements; 2)  
regulation that merely requires firms to gather information (such as release of toxic 
chemicals) raises corporate awareness and thereby achieves environmental improvements; 3) 
  
9 
 
regulation reduces uncertainty about the value of environmental investments; 4)  regulation 
provides pressure that incentivizes innovation; 5) regulation “levels the transitional playing 
field” ensuring all firms make the required environmental investment. 
Interestingly, Porter Hypothesis’ story of regulation-induced innovation offsets gets some 
support from formal neoclassical economic models that demonstrate environmental policy 
resulting in welfare increases – excluding the benefit of a cleaner environment – (see, for e.g., 
Mohr, 2002; Greaker, 2003; Mohr and Saha, 2008; and Andréa et al., 2009).10 The key idea 
in these models is a strategic role in technology adoption that is motivated by the twin key 
assumptions of technological change and external economies of scale in production 
(analogous to what Porter might call spillovers between firms in localized clusters). As 
pointed out by Mohr (2002), the analogy between his Porter-Hypothesis-type result and the 
infant industry argument of a strategic trade policy is evident. In both cases the basic theme is 
nurturing potential ‘winners’ – industries that are characterized by external economies of 
scale. However, unlike the method of protection underlying the infant industry argument, 
environmental regulation does the nurturing by forcing firms (thereby solving the 
‘coordination failure’ which causes firms’ under-investment in cleaner and more productive 
technologies) to engage in innovations that can (more than) pay for the costs of compliance to 
regulation. 
One aspect of the Porter Hypothesis needs to be emphasized. While there may not be 
much explicit in PH about what sector of the economy it applies to, we argue that the PH 
must have a particular focus.  As noted above, for the competitiveness school, a concern for 
competitiveness focuses on ‘winner’ industries: “If the industries that are losing position to 
foreign rivals are the more productive ones in the economy, a nation’s ability to sustain 
productivity growth [read competitiveness] is threatened” (Porter, 1990, p. 9). Indeed 
according to Porter, one of the mechanisms for raising competitiveness is farming out the 
‘dog’ industries (i.e. low-productivity activities) to others and importing the products 
concerned. The following statement is particularly revealing:  “…America can be better off 
when a low-value-added manufacturing task is moved from the Midwest to Brazil…” (Porter 
and Rivkin, 2012b, p. 60). 
That means the Porter Hypothesis of regulation-induced innovation offsets and 
enhancement of competitiveness refers specifically to ‘winner’ industries, i.e. technology-
intensive sectors. As already pointed out above, in such sectors price or cost per se (such as 
environmental compliance cost) is not crucial for international competitiveness. When Porter 
 10 
and van der Linde state “…the sectors where high environmental costs were associated with 
negative trade performance were ones such as ferrous metal mining, non-ferrous metal 
mining,…where the U.S. suffers from dwindling raw material deposits, very high relative 
electricity cost,…that have rendered them uncompetitive quite apart from environmental 
costs” (1995, p. 108) they are suggesting that the focus has to be on ‘winners’ and that 
‘laggards should be ignored’. 
In summary, Porter’s view is that international competitiveness is about hosting selective 
technology-based industries that are capable of raising standards of living in the entire 
economy. Such industries are not the sorts that are easily flustered by environmental 
regulation. Indeed, their very nature means that they can actually benefit (i.e. enhance their 
competitiveness) from well-crafted environmental regulation. 
4. An overview of the empirical evidence 
The two competing hypotheses discussed in Sections 2 and 3 are summarised in Figure 1. 
Empirical evaluation of competing hypotheses can be difficult for one reason or another. An 
empirical work claiming to test a certain hypothesis may not be accurately doing so, perhaps 
because of the difficulty of operationalzing the concepts or unavailability of appropriate data. 
As shown in Figure 1, here the problem is compounded because the two schools that we want 
to evaluate do not just have different predictions of the impact of environmental regulation on 
competitiveness – but also have somewhat different perspectives of international 
competitiveness itself. Moreover, as already pointed out the competitiveness school’s (the 
Porter Hypothesis’) claim of a win-win outcome of environmental regulation is highly 
conditional on the regulation being ‘well-crafted’. Indeed the issue of the ‘right’ kind of 
environmental regulation (in a particular situation) in terms of efficiency, effectiveness and 
impact on competitiveness is highly debated in the literature (see Iraldo et al., 2011 for a 
critical summary).  While command and control mechanisms (direct regulation) can in certain 
circumstances be viewed as effective, economic instruments such as taxes and tradable 
permits are generally credited for superior efficiency compared with direct regulation. 
Therefore, Porter’s ‘well crafted’ regulation is usually understood to mean ‘flexible market 
based regulation’ (Ambec et al., 2013).  
< Figure 1 about here > 
Coming back to our concern of empirical evaluation of the two competing hypotheses 
identified, a sensible approach is then to focus on what might be the least common 
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denominator of the possible hypotheses of the two schools. The neoclassical view is 
represented by the PHE. Environmental regulations cause the domestic industry to suffer a 
cost disadvantage against foreign rivals and consequently impair export performance and 
locational attractiveness (especially those of pollution-intensive sectors). As argued above, 
whether the ultimate effects (of these changes in trade and investment flows) represent 
‘adjustment costs’ and ‘real exchange rate problem’ or ‘competitiveness’ is largely a matter 
of semantics. 
On the side of the competitiveness school, Porter Hypothesis’ story of regulation-induced 
‘innovation offsets’ has several versions or interpretations (see, e.g., Jaffe et al., 1995; 
Ambec et al., 2013). The analysis in the literature includes such varied outcome measures as 
productivity (efficiency scores and TFP), innovation (environmental patents and 
environmental R&D expenditure), age of capital stock, etc. for particular industries or the 
manufacturing sector as a whole or national economies (see Kozluk and Zipperer, 2014 for a 
recent critical review). The conclusion of this review is that the empirical results are 
generally inconclusive.  There is also a somewhat unique and interesting study on economy-
wide reallocative costs of the U.S. Clean Air Act by Walker (2013). The study reports that 
the total earnings loss to workers in regulated plants amounted to $5.4 billion. 
One approach used in the literature to test the hypothesis on which we will focus is a 
major stand of national measures of competitiveness, namely trade and foreign investment 
flows. This set of measures is more explicitly related to our particular focus of international 
competitiveness. Indeed, this set of measures broadly represents the original hypothesis of 
Porter that environmental regulation can enhance a country’s competitiveness (Porter, 1990; 
Mohr, 2002, p. 158; Ambec et al., 2013). However, as emphasized in Section 3, for the 
competitiveness school national competitiveness relies on ‘high-value’ industries that are 
capable of raising living standards throughout the economy.  
Therefore, the PHE appears to be the common hypothesis for both schools of thought. 
However, given the qualifications of the Porter Hypothesis (i.e. regulation has to be well-
crafted and competitiveness has to do with selective industries) evidence on PHE alone is not 
sufficient to reject the Porter Hypothesis. It is only the minimum evidence required to 
question Porter Hypothesis’ validity. A fully legitimate test of the Porter Hypothesis should, 
inter alia, have a particular emphasis on the impact of well-designed environmental policies 
on high-value economic sectors. More on this in Sub-section 4.3; now we turn to evaluate the 
least common denominator: the PHE. Before proceeding we should reiterate here that we are 
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by no means suggesting that the PH is all about international competiveness and the PHH. As 
we have already pointed out, the central notion of PH that ‘environmental regulation can lead 
to profit enhancing innovations’ has had several interpretations and been tested empirically in 
different ways (see Ambec et al., 2013 for a review). Our focus is on one interpretation of the 
PH, arguably its original form, which suggests that environmental regulation can enhance 
national competitiveness and hence would not lead to the emergence of pollution havens.  
4.1. The impact of environmental regulation on trade flows 
The empirical literature on environmental regulation and trade flows has a history going back 
to the early 1970s.  As the earlier literature has been sufficiently reviewed, we focus here on 
the recent econometric literature (roughly from year 2000 to date).11 The main empirical tools 
are those motivated by the Heckscher-Ohlin theory, specifically the Heckscher-Ohlin-Vanek 
(HOV) equation, which broadly states that a country exports (imports) the commodity that 
entails relatively more (less) intensive use of the factor that is relatively more (less) abundant 
in that country. There are two versions of the HOV motivated empirical tool of trade 
(Leamer, 1984). The first is a cross-country regression of net exports of a given commodity 
group on factor endowments, of which one is environmental regulation:  
 
ititittiit RZT μ+β+γ+η+α= ,     (1) 
 
where T  is a vector of net-exports of a commodity in country i at time t, α  and η are, 
respectively, time-invariant location and location-invariant time fixed effects, Z  is a matrix 
of control variables, namely national factor endowments (i.e. abundance of production factors 
such as labour and capital),   is a vector of coefficients, and   is a vector of error terms. 
The variable R represents some measure of national level environmental stringency. (Because 
it is a cross county regression for a single commodity (group), the explanatory variables are 
country-level variables). There has been very limited application of this version of the HOV 
model mainly because of lack of comparable stringency measure across countries. To the best 
of our knowledge there are only three studies, Cole and Elliot (2003), Diakosavvas (1994), 
Tobey (1990), which report mixed and weak evidence. 
The second version is the cross-commodity equation that aims to explain the trade pattern 
of a particular country by factor intensities. In effect, it tries to reveal factor abundance from 
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a regression of trade on factor intensities. Net exports or imports of a commodity are assumed 
to be a linear function of factor-intensities in the production of that commodity as follows: 
 
itittiit SAT ε+φ+θ′+π+ω= ,     (2) 
 
where T  is a vector of a country’s net exports or imports of commodity i at time t. ω and π 
are vectors of, respectively, time-invariant industry and industry-invariant time fixed effects, 
'A  is a matrix of factor intensities (i.e. the required level of factor input (such as labour) use 
by industry) , which typically include (skilled) labour intensity, capital intensity, R&D 
intensity, and other controls such as tariff, θ  is a vector of coefficients to be estimated, and   
is a vector of error terms. S represents pollution-abatement-and-control costs incurred by (or 
emission intensities of) industries to capture R in equation (1) as it applies to a particular 
industry. (Because it is a cross-commodity regression for a single country, the explanatory 
variables refer to commodity groups). This is by far the most typical model employed in the 
empirical literature.12 The early set of studies in this category has been critically reviewed by, 
among others, Jaffe et al. (1995) and Copeland and Taylor (2004). For brevity and 
completeness we only summarise the conclusion made in these reviews and proceed to a brief 
review of studies from about 2000 onwards – those that have not been sufficiently covered by 
Copeland and Taylor (2004). An overview of these studies is given in Table 1. 
< Figure 1 about here > 
The main feature of these early studies is the use of cross-sectional data (mainly of U.S. 
industries) and treatment of environmental regulation as exogenous. The widely quoted 
conclusion from Jaffe et al. (1995, p. 157) goes: “Overall, there is relatively little evidence to 
support the hypothesis that environmental regulation has a large adverse effect on 
competitiveness, however that elusive term is defined”. A different conclusion is given by 
Copeland and Taylor (2004, p. 41) who argue that “[i]n sharp contrast to the earlier work, 
these studies have tended to find that differences in environmental policy do affect trade and 
investment flows”.  
Some more recent studies also suggest a detrimental impact of environmental stringency 
on trade flows. The distinguishing feature of these studies is that they account for 
endogeneity of environmental regulation i.e. for the possibility that such a regulation 
responds to the size and structure of trade and investment flows. Countries with large 
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production by polluting industries might raise their environmental standards or those with 
negligible amount of polluting activities may not enact stringent environmental policies 
(Millimet and Roy, 2015). The exceptions are Cole and Elliott (2003) who use cross-sectional 
data, and Mulatu et al. (2004) and Babool and Reed (2010) who both treat environmental 
policy as exogenous. 
Cole and Elliott (2003) distinguish between two somewhat different questions and 
examine respectively in the Heckscher-Ohlin and in the new trade models: does 
environmental regulation affect net exports of pollution-intensive goods?; and does 
environmental regulation, like the traditional factor endowments, play a role in the 
composition of trade? The answer to the second question is consistent with the PHE while to 
the first question it is not. Ederington and Minier (2003) directly test PHE on the basis of a 
simultaneous determination of U.S. manufacturing imports and pollution abatement costs. 
Unlike the results of the standard panel estimators, the instrumental-variable estimator reveals 
the pollution haven effect. In a change of focus, Ederington et al. (2004) examine the 
changing patterns of specialization in U.S. manufacturing exports and imports in the face of 
trade liberalization. They find no evidence of a disproportionate rise in dirty-good imports – 
hence no evidence of the pollution haven effect. 
Mulatu et al. (2004) investigate manufacturing net exports data from Germany, the 
Netherlands and the U.S. and report mixed results – varying across estimators, countries and 
industry groups. Cole et al. (2005) analyze the U.S.’s revealed comparative advantage to 
examine the hypothesis of a decline in the U.S.’s specialization in pollution-intensive 
industries. They find no support for a pollution haven effect and conclude that such industries 
are also intensive in physical and human capital with which the U.S. is relatively well 
endowed. Ederington et al. (2005) examine U.S. net imports and make a crucial observation 
that pollution intensive industries tend to be less geographical mobile. Taking due account of 
these observation and also the source of imports (developing versus developed countries), 
they find a significant pollution haven effect. Cole et al. (2010) undertake a similar study for 
Japan and arrive at the more or less identical conclusion. Levinson and Taylor (2008) analyse 
net exports of U.S. industries. Using panel estimators and instrumenting for the 
environmental variable they find evidence of the pollution haven effect. Babool and Reed 
(2010) examine net exports from OECD countries using panel data while treating pollution 
control costs as exogenous. The results are mixed. For paper and wood which are pollution-
intensive and textile products which are not, they find a positive relationship between net 
exports and environmental regulation; for most other manufacturing industries they find the 
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reverse. The authors try to explain their finding of ‘unexpected’ positive relationship with 
respect to paper and wood by invoking the Porter Hypothesis and arguing: this sector “uses a 
renewable resource that can be managed and advertised as such on products [which] could 
make net exports more responsive to documented environmental regulations” (p. 2322).      
4.2. The impact of environmental regulation on foreign investment flows 
A second strand of the literature in the PHE is focused on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI).13 
Again we ignore the early studies already critically reviewed in, among others, Jaffe et al. 
(1995). An overview of these studies is provided in Table 1. The empirical tools for 
analyzing FDI patterns generally use the same explanatory factors employed in the empirical 
trade literature discussed above (Eskeland and Harrison, 2003, p. 6). A generic model of FDI 
flows can be written as: 
ijtitjtittjiijt eRVKFDI      (3) 
where ijtFDI  is a vector of a measure of a multinational enterprise’s activity (including a 
binary variable of 0 or 1 for the existence of a multinational enterprise) in location i, industry 
j and year t. K and V are, respectively, matrices of observable control variables, namely: 
location characteristics and industry attributes. The variable R represents stringency of 
national environmental regulation. α , λ  and η  are vectors of, respectively, time-invariant 
location and industry fixed effects, and location- and industry-invariant time fixed effects. τ  
and δ  are vectors of coefficients, and e  is a vector of error terms. To the best of our 
knowledge, the only study that  has estimated this most general specification is Poelhekke 
and van der Ploeg (2015). Kellenberg (2009) which uses a ‘region’ dummy instead of 
‘country’ dummy for location fixed effects is closer to this general formulation. Either index i 
or j will not appear in all other papers. The reason for this is unavailability of such a rich 
three-dimensional dataset; or when it is available as in the case of Kellenberg, for example, 
the limited year to year variation in most country characteristics variables (especially the 
environmental variable) makes estimation impossible due to multicollinearity.  
Location in Equation (3) refers to country, state or region, and the characteristics can 
include three broad classes of variables. The first is gravity-model type variables such as 
GDP, GDP per capita, distance and a common language (as in Javorcik and Wei, 2004; 
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Kellenberg, 2009; and Manderson and Kneller, 2012) whereas Kheder and Zugravu (2012) 
use market potential. 
The second is Heckscher-Ohlin type variables that include infrastructure quality and 
traditional factor endowment variables such as labour, capital, land and energy (as in Dean et 
al., 2009; Kellenberg, 2009; Millimet and Roy, 2015; and Manderson and Kneller, 2012). 
The third is general policy environment which typically includes corruption, protection of 
intellectual property and openness to trade (as in Javorcik and Wei, 2004; Kellenberg, 2009; 
and Manderson and Kneller, 2012). 
Typical industry attributes that appear in Equation (3) are largely the counterpart of the 
country characteristics and include: factor intensities (such as skilled labour and R&D use) 
and factor prices including pollution control costs (or emissions); intangible assets (one 
common proxy of which is labour productivity); exports share and scale economies (as in 
Eskeland and Harrison, 2003; Javorcik and Wei, 2004; Manderson and Kneller, 2012; and 
Kheder and Zugravu, 2012). 
About half of the studies that are based on Equation (3) are focused on investigating 
inbound FDI. List and Co (2000), Keller and Levinson (2002), Fredriksson et al. (2003) and 
Millimet and Ray (2015) all find some evidence of a pollution haven effect, namely that 
stringent environmental regulation lowers FDI inflows to the U.S.  The latter three studies 
treat environmental regulation as endogenous.  Studies that focus on inbound FDI to 
countries other than the U.S. include Javorcik and Wei (2004) who examine inbound FDI to 
eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union; Dean et al. (2009) that focus on inbound FDI to 
China; Waldkirch and Gopinath (2008) who consider the case of inbound FDI to Mexico; and 
Cole and Fredriksson (2009) who analyse patterns of FDI inflows to 13 OECD and 20 
developing countries. The results in each of these studies are rather heterogeneous along 
various dimensions: measures of environmental stringency (Javorcik and Wei, 2004); 
measures of pollution and groups of industries (Waldkirch and Gopinath, 2008); and 
pollution intensity and country of FDI origin (Dean et al., 2009). Only Cole and Fredriksson 
(2009) treat environmental regulation as endogenous and report evidence of a pollution haven 
effect. 
Studies on outbound FDI also mainly focus on the U.S. Xing and Kolstad (2002) compare 
regression results for dirty and clean industries (or all manufacturing) and obtain some 
evidence of a pollution haven effect for heavily polluting U.S. industries. Eskeland and 
Harrison (2003) also examine the pattern of U.S. FDI to developing countries to see if the 
latter are used as pollution havens. They find no robust evidence for the emergence of 
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pollution havens – a result they ascribe to the potential complementarily between capital 
(which the U.S. is well endowed with) and pollution abatement. Cole and Elliott (2005) 
investigate the pattern of U.S. FDI flows to Brazil and Mexico – countries that are not too 
capital-poor and hence, the authors argue, are likely pollution havens because of a strong 
correlation between capital-intensity and pollution-intensity. Treating environmental policy 
as endogenous, they find that the ‘key forces’ of attraction for a U.S. industry is its capital 
requirements while pollution control costs in the U.S. is also a push factor. Kellenberg (2009) 
analyses the value added of U.S. outbound FDI in a cross-country and cross-industry setting, 
treating environmental regulation as endogenous. He reports a robust pollution haven effect. 
Hanna (2010) examines U.S. outbound FDI but she uses a difference-in-difference model – 
with no observable firm/industry controls – and finds evidence of a pollution haven effect. 
There are nine non-U.S. studies on outbound FDI. Ljungwall and Linde-Rahr (2005) study 
FDI flows to 28 Chinese provinces between 1987 and 1998. Using provincial pollution levy 
paid by the average firm, they report that environmental policy reduce FDI in only less 
developed regions of China. Similarly, Di (2007) uses data on a cross-section of Chinese 
provinces for 1996 and concludes that FDI firms in polluting industries are deterred by 
environmental regulation. Spatareanu (2007) examines FDI flows in Europe and considers 
differential stringency of environmental regulation between home and host countries. She 
reports that stringency is associated with both higher probability of FDI occurrence and larger 
volume of investment. Kheder and Zugravu (2012) analyse the patterns of French outbound 
FDI while Kirkpatrick and Shimamoto (2011) examine Japanese FDI in pollution-intensive 
firms alone. Finally, Manderson and Kneller (2012) and Poelhekke and van der Ploeg (2015) 
do the same respectively for the Netherlands and for U.K outbound FDI.. Kheder and 
Zugravu (2012) report somewhat mixed evidence: a pollution haven effect for their pooled 
sample and for some subsets of the sample but not for developing countries that have ‘too 
lax’ environmental regulation. Kirkpatrick and Shimamoto (2011) and Manderson and 
Kneller (2012) fail to find robust evidence to suggest that environmental regulation is a 
strong influence on the location behaviour of multinationals firms. On the contrary, 
Kirkpatrick and Shimamoto (2011) find that Japanese FDI seems attracted by stringent but 
‘stable environmental regulatory framework’.  
Poelhekke and van der Ploeg (2015) report a somewhat unique evidence of both pollution 
haven effects and green haven effects (where CRS minded footloose sectors are attracted by 
higher environmental standards). Poelhekke and van der Ploeg’s (2015) finding needs some 
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emphasizing. The key message is that there is no ‘average’ effect of regulation on FDI 
outflow; the effect depends, among other things, on the home country (green credentials 
matter) and the nature of the sector.  
4.3. Summary remarks on the empirical evidence for the PHE 
Overall, the weight of the evidence from both strands of the literature suggests that compared 
to the earlier work, increasingly studies document findings of a pollution haven effect. 
Nonetheless, there are numerous studies that fail to find any evidence on the PHE. And this 
failure does not have much to do with the use of sophisticated econometrics. So unlike what 
Copeland and Taylor (2004) seem to suggest, accounting for endogeneity of environmental 
policy and unobserved location and industry heterogeneity has not quite solved the puzzle of 
finding the pollution haven effect. 
Does it follow from this that we have some evidence of the Porter Hypothesis? No, what 
we can say is that there is no conclusive evidence refuting the Porter Hypothesis. Indeed, we 
can argue that even if we were willing to be persuaded by the argument that most recent 
studies have succeeded in uncovering the pollution haven effect, it would still be wrong to 
take this as clear evidence rejecting the Porter Hypothesis. First as already pointed out above 
the Porter Hypothesis hinges on well-designed environmental regulations to spur innovation 
that offsets environmental compliance costs. There is no reason to believe that the various 
measures of regulatory stringency employed in the literature are what Porter would call ‘well 
crafted’ (Ambec et al. (2013) also makes this point). According to Porter and van der Linde 
(1995, pp. 110-111) the key to a win-win outcome of environmental regulation is that the 
regulatory system has to focus on “clear goals [and] flexible approaches”. Lack of clarity and 
the associated uncertainty undermines a long-term and continuous effort to innovate. Rigid 
technological standards deprive firms of endeavouring for innovative approaches to achieving 
the desired goal of emissions reduction. Economic incentive approaches (such as emissions 
charges and emissions trading) leave the issue of how to achieve assigned environmental 
goals to firms and thus make the burden of compliance easier  or even lead to innovation 
offsets.14 There is some micro level evidence on such win-win outcomes of market-based 
environmental regulations (see Lankoski (2010) for a recent review). 
There is a second reason why evidence on the PHH should not be taken as clear evidence 
to refute the Porter Hypothesis. As already discussed in Section 3, to Porter international 
competitiveness of a national economy is tied to particular industries, namely those engaged 
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in technology-intensive industries. Porter admits that environmental regulation might cause 
what he calls ‘dog’ industries (i.e. not knowledge/technology-intensive ones) to lose out in 
the international competition for market share. But he does not view this as a concern because 
such industries do not have much to do with international competitiveness of the national 
economy. Those industries capable of maintaining or enhancing international competitiveness 
of the national economy while being micro-economically competitive are likely to thrive 
rather than be weakened by environmental regulation. The PHE empirical literature is largely 
oblivious to such sector-specific views of the Porter Hypothesis. That is to say, it does not 
explicitly test Porter-type hypotheses that go along the lines of ‘internationally competitive 
firms that are capable of raising standards of living for the nation as a whole are unlikely to 
be impaired by a well designed environmental regulation’. 
It should be pointed out that there is a danger of unduly insulating the Porter Hypothesis 
against possible falsifications if we downplay any evidence contradicting the hypothesis by 
saying ‘the focus was not on technology-intensive industries or the regulation was not well-
designed’.15 However, our main argument here is that there is hardly any conclusive evidence 
of the PHE even for the non-technology-intensive industries and for possibly badly designed 
regulations. 
5. Summary and concluding remarks 
This paper is a critical review of the literature on environmental regulation and international 
competitiveness with a particular focus on the macro-level use of the concept of 
competitiveness. We identify two broad schools of thought on competitiveness and discuss at 
length the basic tenets underlying each. Neoclassical economics, while reluctant to use the 
concept at the national level, sees an adverse effect of environmental regulation on a national 
economy at least owing to the inevitable costs of restructuring. Such costs can be reflected in 
national measures of international competitiveness such as trade and foreign investment 
flows which are indeed the object of investigation in the PHE. 
In contrast, the competitiveness school maintains that international competitiveness – in 
the sense of raising domestic income in the face of international division of labour – is 
something economies should actively aim to enhance by nurturing ‘winners’ – industries that 
involve dynamic externalities such as scale economies. Interestingly enough, environmental 
regulation can be ‘nurturing’ by forcing firms (hence solving the ‘coordination problem’ 
among themselves) to engage in innovations, the benefit of which can (more than) offset the 
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compliance costs. Consequently, environmental regulation can go hand in hand with 
maintaining or improving competitiveness of an economy that is dependent on the success of 
‘winner’ industries, which rather than being flustered by regulation are likely to thrive. This 
favorable outcome could in turn be reflected in rising export shares and investment inflows of 
industries with superior productivity. 
 The empirical evidence pertaining to the PHE has yet to reach a consensus view on the 
precise relationship between environmental regulation and trade and investment flows. True, 
more and more recent studies with sophisticated econometrics tend to document some 
evidence of the pollution haven effect, but the literature as a whole is far from presenting 
robust evidence supporting the PHE. One can therefore argue that the Porter Hypothesis (in 
the particular interpretation adopted here) remains largely unscathed because, at the least, one 
would need to find evidence on the PHE to question the validity of the Porter Hypothesis. A 
fully legitimate test of the Porter Hypothesis should, inter alia, have a particular emphasis on 
the impact of properly designed environmental policies on ‘high value sectors’ of an 
economy. 
With further integration of the world economy through successive trade agreements that 
gradually phase out trade barriers such as quotas and tariffs, a concern for international 
competitiveness might lead governments to use environmental policy as a hidden trade 
policy. In particular, the march to increased globalisation could cause a race-to-the-bottom in 
environmental regulation as jurisdictions try to undercut each other’s standards. The 
conclusion of this review paper questions the premise of this whole debate: well designed and 
consistently enforced environmental regulations do not seem to impair competitiveness 
significantly.  
  
Notes 
1 We use the term neoclassical economics rather loosely to refer to theories based on the following key 
assumption: individuals have rational preferences among outcomes; individuals maximize utility and firms 
maximize profits; and individuals act independently on the basis of full and relevant information (Weintraub, 
2013). We also use the term ‘the competitiveness school’ loosely to represent the Porter Hypothesis and the 
underlying paradigm whose distinction is apparent from the title of Porter’s major work, The Competitive 
Advantage of Nations (1990), which is itself a dissent from the centuries-old principle of ‘comparative 
advantage’. 
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2 Some consider the concept to be unimportant, irrelevant or misleading (see, e.g. Krugman, 1996). Notice how 
Jaffe et al. (1995) put competitiveness in quotation marks and refrained from offering a concrete definition for it. 
3 Note the proposed indices of competitiveness by IMF based economists (e.g. Marsh and Tokarick, 1994) and 
the regular publication of similar indices by The Financial Times.  
4 A related point here is the potential spill over benefits (by way of diffusion of technology including better 
environmental products and standards) to countries receiving FDI. While such benefits are not inevitable and 
materialize only on particular conditions (see e.g. Blomstrom and Kokko, 2001 and Kokko et al., 1996) the key 
point remains that the competitiveness advantage of being an attractive location can potential be considerable.  
5 PHE should be distinguished from its closely related term, the Pollution Haven Hypothesis which describes the 
effect of trade liberalization on pollution-intensive industry in countries with lax regulation (Copeland and 
Taylor, 2004, p. 9). 
6 There are different types of classifications for high technology industries and the basis of the classification can 
be judgments by experts (Tyson 1992, p. 20).  
7As the father of new trade theory, Paul Krugman has in principle much to agree with the competitiveness 
school, but like most fellow neoclassical economists he is a “cautious non-activist” and parts company with this 
school when it comes to policy prescriptions because of the difficulties involved in practical formulation of 
strategic trade and industrial policies (Krugman, 1996, pp.110- 111). 
8 Increasing returns essentially means the advantages of large-scale production. The significance of the concept 
of increasing returns derives from the issue of how early (seemingly inconsequential) events, which cause an 
increase in scale, feed on themselves to increase the scale even further in a dynamic setting (in other words the 
system is path-dependent (Arthur, 1990). 
9As we will see below Mohr (2002, p. 167) presents an argument along these lines in his story of a win-win 
outcome of environmental regulation because of induced ‘innovation offsets’.  
10 While these neoclassical models show that the Porter Hypothesis is a theoretical possibility, they emphasize 
that the potential problem with implementation of an environmental policy leading to a win-win outcome 
outweighs the potential benefit. And hence the policy implication they draw is still the traditional ‘benefit-cost-
rule’ to environmental policy making (see Mohr 2002, p. 167). 
11Jaffe et al. (1995) and Copeland and Taylor (2004) present two prominent reviews. The earliest studies were 
of exploratory nature investigating trends in trade, especially in dirty goods (see Mulatu et al., 2003). The results 
reported by these studies are mixed but suffer from a serious weakness. “The search for pollution havens in the 
data has obscured the role capital accumulation and natural resources must play in determining dirty-industry 
migration” (Copeland and Taylor, 2004, p. 41). 
12There are two sets of exceptions. Notable examples in the first include van de Beers and van den Bergh (1997, 
2003), Kee et al. (2010) and Arouri et al. (2012) who employ a gravity model. Somewhat similar to this group 
of studies, Grether et al. (2012) also use a gravity framework but focus on analysis of the ‘pollution content of 
trade’. While van de Beers and van den Bergh (1997, 2003) find mixed evidence for the pollution haven effect; 
Grether (2015) also find a pollution haven effect albeit ‘not quantitatively significant or systematic’; and the 
other two do not find any evidence supporting the PHE. The second set consists of Kahn (2003), Cave and 
 
 Blomquist (2008) and Khan and Yoshino (2004) who all use a somewhat ad hoc framework to examine the 
PHE. The former two studies investigate, respectively, trends in U.S. pollution intensive trade and trends in 
European Union energy/ toxic intensive trade. They report mixed evidence on the pollution haven effect. The 
latter analyse of the composition of trade (in terms of its pollution-intensity) within and across trading blocs. 
The study reports some support for the PHE. In a related enquiry, Costantini and Crespi (2008) find that 
environmental regulation confers a comparative advantage in energy technologies. 
13 There is also a related literature that focuses on plant/ industry location in general, one example of which is 
FDIMulatu et al. (2010) that focuses on industry location in Europe. 
14 While evidence on actual innovation offsets may be scarce, there seem to be ample evidence on the positive 
impact of regulation on eco process and product innovations through environmental R&D (Demirel and 
Kesidou, 2011 and Kesidou and Demirel, 2012). 
15 I owe this point to an anonymous referee. 
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 Figure 1 Schematic representation of the two hypotheses on environmental regulations and 
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Table 1 Select review of empirical papers on environmental regulation and trade and investment flows 
Author(s)  Type of data Addressing 
endogeneity 
Trade/FDI flows to/from Evidence of 
PHH 
 
Trade flows 
Cole and Elliott (2003) 
 
Cross section No US net exports Mixed 
Ederington and Minier (2003) 
 
Panel Yes US net imports Yes 
Mulatu et al. (2004) 
 
Panel No German, Netherlands & US net exports Mixed 
Ederington et al. (2004) 
 
Panel Yes US net imports No 
Cole et al. (2005) 
 
Panel Yes US net exports No 
Ederington et al. (2005) 
 
Panel No US net imports Yes 
Levinson & Taylor (2008) 
 
Panel Yes US net exports Yes 
Babool and Reed (2010) 
 
Panel No OECD net exports Mixed 
Cole et al. (2010)  Panel No Japan’s net imports Yes 
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Author(s)  Type of data Addressing 
endogeneity 
Trade/FDI flows to/from Evidence of 
PHH 
FDI flows 
List and Co (2000) 
 
Cross-section No To US from various Yes 
Keller and Levinson (2002) 
 
Panel  Yes To US from various Yes 
Xing and Kolstad (2002) 
 
Cross-section Yes To various from US  Yes 
Dean et al. (2003) 
 
Cross-section No To China from various Mixed 
Eskeland and Harrison (2003) 
 
Panel No To developing countries from US  No 
Fredriksson et al. (2003) 
 
Panel Yes To US from various Yes 
Javorcik and Wei (2004) 
 
Cross-section No To Eastern Europe from various Mixed 
Cole and Elliot (2005) 
 
Panel Yes To Brazil and Mexico from US No 
Ljungwall and Linde-Rahr (2005) 
 
Panel No To China’s provinces from various Mixed 
Di (2007) 
 
Cross-section No To China’s provinces from various Yes 
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Author(s)  Type of data Addressing 
endogeneity 
Trade/FDI flows to/from Evidence of 
PHH 
Spatareanu (2007) 
 
Cross-section No To Europe from various Yes 
Waldkirch and Gopinath (2008) 
 
Cross-section No To Mexico from various Mixed 
Dean et al. (2009) 
 
Cross-section No To China from various Mixed 
Cole and Fredriksson (2009) 
 
Cross-section Yes From various to various  Yes 
Kellenberg (2009) 
 
Panel Yes To various from US  Yes 
Hanna (2010) 
 
Panel No To various from US  Yes 
Kirkpatrick and Shimamoto (2011) 
 
Cross-section No To various from Japan  No 
Manderson and Kneller (2012) 
 
Cross-section No To various from UK  No 
Kheder and Zugravu (2012) 
 
Cross-section Yes To various from France  Mixed 
Millimet and Roy (2015) Panel Yes To US from various Yes 
Poelhekke and van der Ploeg (2015) Panel Yes To various from Netherlands  Mixed 
 
